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Abstract
This paper examines linkages between international trade, environmental degradation, and economic growth
in a dynamic North–South trade game. Using a neoclassical production function subject to an endogenously
improving technology, North produces manufactured goods by employing labor, capital, and a natural
resource that it imports from South. South extracts the resource using raw labor, in the process generating
local pollution.We study optimal regional policies in the presence of local pollution and technology spillovers
from North to South under both non-cooperative and cooperative modes of trade. Non-cooperative trade is
inefficient due to stock externalities. Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet do not benefit North.
Both regions gain from improved productivity in North and faster knowledge diffusion to South regardless
of the trading regime.roie_800 906..926
1. Introduction
Natural resources are an important component of world trade. To many less devel-
oped countries they are a critical source of foreign exchange, while to many developed
economies they are indispensable factors of production. As a consequence, natural
resource policy inevitably involves strategic aspects that can be conveniently analyzed
as a dynamic game between the industrial North and the less developed South.The key
elements of this game are that the natural resource is supplied by the South using labor
of which it has a surplus endowment. North requires the natural resource as an essential
input for its industrial output, part of which it trades to the South for their consumption.
One important aspect of the trading relationship that we envision is that the deci-
sions of both regions involve potential externalities that they are likely to impose. First,
the extraction of the resource is likely to cause significant persistent or even irreversible
environment damage. In this regard, in making its production decisions and thereby
generating its demand for the natural resource, the North is likely to cause pollution in
the South, a fact that it ignores in making its decision-making. For its part, the South,
being the sole supplier of the natural resource, has monopoly power, that it finds
optimal to exploit in setting the price at which it is willing to trade. By ignoring these
spillover effects, the time paths generated by non-cooperative behavior are likely to be
dynamically inefficient.
The relationship between trade policy, economic growth, and the environment has
evolved into a long literature, exploring many issues. Using a differential game frame-
work, Galor (1986) focuses on the slower growth rate that results when North and
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South trade non-cooperatively. Chichilnisky (1994) emphasizes ill-defined property
rights over South’s resources which gives rise to over-exploitation of South’s environ-
ment. A resource monopoly is desirable as it would curb pollution, but it is also
inefficient as it will hamper economic growth. Grossman and Helpman (1991) draw
attention to the beneficial effects of trade on research and development and capital
accumulation. Alemdar and Ozyildirim (1998, 2002) note that the unwanted effect of a
resource monopoly is mitigated when trade is accompanied by knowledge spillovers to
the South.1
Also, many studies inquire about the feasibility of sustained economic growth when
environment acts as a natural constraint (e.g. Gradus and Smulders, 1993; Bovenberg
and Smulders, 1995). These studies, however, either ignore trade relationships between
regions or assume that they are identical (e.g. Hettich, 2000).
In this paper we focus on the strategic aspects of trade in natural resources by
extending the standard dynamic North–South model to one in which production in the
North takes place in two sectors: a final output sector and a knowledge-producing
sector. Both sectors are general with respect to their respective returns to scale, and
indeed, the productive side of the North economy is characteristic of the recent non-
scale growth models, pioneered by Jones (1995) and further developed by Eicher and
Turnovsky (1999). An important feature of our analysis is that as knowledge accumu-
lates in the North it facilitates the abatement of pollution in the South, and to capture
this critical role satisfactorily is the reason for the disaggregation of North’s production.
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we set out the analytical solution and
characterize the equilibrium dynamics.2 Then, the dynamic responses to various struc-
tural changes are analyzed and compared with the efficient paths. Specifically, we
consider (i) a 30% productivity increase in the knowledge-producing sector, (ii) a
tripling in the applicability of knowledge to pollution reduction in the South, and (iii)
a doubling in the environmental damage rate of the natural resource.
Owing to the inefficiencies that accompany the non-cooperative mode of trade,
global welfare is substantially lower under non-cooperation than it is under coopera-
tion. Also noteworthy is the fact that a regime switch from a cooperative to a
non-cooperative trade regime, while always reducing South’s welfare, increases North’s
welfare. Consequently, not only is North unwilling to cooperate, but also the inefficien-
cies that arise from such a reluctance are severe. South sets the resource price to
internalize the local cost of pollution as well as to extract monopoly rent from North.
From a global perspective, to the extent that North also cares about South’s environ-
ment, resource prices would be inefficiently low because they would reflect only the
local cost of pollution. But then, this would be partly alleviated thanks to the exercise
of monopoly power by the South. Thus, insofar as North cares about South’s environ-
ment, South’s monopoly is not that bad after all.
North, on the other hand, decides on a resource allocation so as to maximize its own
welfare. Resources allocated to the production of final goods yield immediate higher
consumption while resources that are employed in the technology sector will yield
higher consumption only in the future. Given that delaying consumption is costly, that
resources that pollute South are employed only in the final goods production, and
that neither region internalizes the knowledge spillover, all lead to an inefficiently small
knowledge sector from a global perspective. As a result, an excess production of final
goods cause an over-accumulation of physical capital and an over-use of resources, the
latter ultimately leading to an excessive level of pollution in the South.
Indeed, the same results are replicated under various parameter configurations,
attesting to the fact that knowledge spillovers can be a significant source of distortions
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in global growth. Further, although the pollution we consider is local in nature, none-
theless it has global ramifications for growth when coupled with knowledge spillovers.
All else being the same, an increased rate of knowledge diffusion in the South makes
resource extraction less costly, leading to lower prices and thus faster accumulation of
both physical capital and knowledge in the North. Conversely, North’s growth can be
checked if resource extraction creates more damage to South’s environment. Trade




The global economy comprises two regions, North and South. Each region is populated
with infinitely-lived identical individuals, LN in North and LS in South, which grow at
the exogenous rates, L L nN N N= and L L nS S S= , respectively. Since our main interest
lies in the analysis of how various sources of inefficiencies interact to distort growth
trajectories in an aggregative dynamic game framework, we adopt the social planning
paradigm.
The North produces a final good, Y, that can be either consumed, invested, or
exported to the South at a fixed price of unity. Manufactured goods are produced using
labor, capital, technology (knowledge), A, and a raw material (resource), R, using a
Cobb–Douglas production function:
Y A uL vK RY NA L K R= [ ] [ ]φ α α α α , (1)
where fY is an exogenous technological shift parameter, ai, 0 < ai < 1 (i = A, L, K, R) are
the productive elasticities, while u and v are the respective fractions of labor and capital
employed in the final good sector. Raw material is imported from the South.
New knowledge is produced in the technology sector by employing labor and capital,
together with the existing technology, while existing knowledge depreciates at a con-
stant rate, dA. Thus the state of technology evolves according to:
A A u L v K A J AA N A AA L K= −( )[ ] −( )[ ] − ≡ −φ δ δβ β β1 1 , (2a)
where fA reflects the technology level and bi, 0 < bi < 1 (i = A, L, K) are productive
elasticities.
Equilibrium in North’s final good sector is described by:
K Y C C KN S K= − − − δ . (2b)
This equation asserts that North’s final output is either consumed in the North, CN,
exported to the South, CS, allocated to replace depreciated capital, dKK, or accumulated
as new capital, K̇. South finances its purchase of consumption imports by the export of
raw materials, which it sells at the relative price p (South’s terms of trade), over which
it has a monopoly. We assume that trade between the two regions is balanced, so that
C pRS = , (3)
implying
K Y C pR KN K= − − − δ . (2b′)
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Equation (2b′) indicates that by controlling its terms of trade, South can indirectly
influence the pace of physical capital accumulation in the North.
North’s planner takes the South’s terms of trade as given and is assumed to maximize
the intertemporal utility of the representative agent, namely,
max , , ,
, , ,C u v R




N NJ C L e dt= ( )( ) < >−
∞
∫ 1 0 00 γ γ ρ
γ ρ (4)
subject to the production and the accumulation constraints (1), (2a), (2b′), K(0) = K0,
A(0) = A0, and CN 3 0. CN/LN is per capita consumption, and rN denotes the North’s rate
of time preference. The parameter g N is related to North’s intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, sN say, by sN = (1 - gN)-1, so that the restriction gN < 0 implies sN < 1, an
assumption broadly consistent with the empirical evidence.
The South is a small developing economy that has no capital. Its sole economic
activity lies in producing the raw material, which is done by employing labor alone in
accordance with the constant-returns-to-scale production function:3
R t bL tS( ) = ( ). (5)
South’s production is unconstrained by labor availability, LS(t).4 Thus, what we have in
mind is a typical small oil-producing economy that finances its consumption out of its
oil revenues.5
Resource extraction causes pollution which accumulates locally and is internalized
only in the South. However, technology accumulated in the North diffuses to the South
to reduce this damage, albeit at a diminishing rate. Thus, the resulting patterns of trade
and growth are further complicated due to the presence of local externalities.
The level of pollution in the South, P, evolves in accordance with:
P R A PP= ( ) −−1 θ δθ ε , (6)
where q > 1 measures the order of environmental damage due to extraction, 0 < e < 1 is
a technology diffusion (spillover) parameter signifying the degree of applicability of
technology to pollution reduction, and 0 < dP < 1 denotes the constant instantaneous
rate at which pollution decays naturally.6
In addition to per capita consumption, the utility of South’s representative agent
depends inversely upon the stock of pollution, P. Facing North’s demand for the
resource, South’s planner takes North’s policies as given and chooses terms of trade to
maximize South’s welfare, namely:
max , , , ,
p
S S S S S
t
S SJ C L DPL e dt DS S= ( )( ) −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < > >
− −∞∫ 1 0 0 00 γ γ ρ
γ τ ρ   (7)
subject to (1), (2b), (3), and (6), P(0) = P0, K(0) = K0, and Cs 3 0, where rS is South’s rate
of time preference. The exponent 0 < t < 1 reflects the degree to which South’s repre-
sentative agent perceives pollution as a public bad, and D converts pollution into units
of utility. Following Eriksson and Zehaie (2005), we shall call the ratio P LSτ the
perceived pollution. Note that t = 0 corresponds to the case where pollution exhibits
pure public bad characteristics: if both pollution and population are doubled, the
pollution that each individual suffers from doubles as well. On the other hand, t = 1
corresponds to the case where pollution exhibits pure private bad characteristics;
doubling pollution and the population results in no more disutility of pollution per
person.
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Cooperative North/South Trade
In designing cooperative strategies, North and South must agree in advance as to how
they will share the potential gains from cooperation. The distributive outcome will
depend on the weights, w, that are attached to the respective welfares. The determina-
tion of the value of w most likely to prevail in a cooperative agreement requires a
bargaining framework which recognizes the relative power of the participants. This
is outside the scope of our inquiry. Instead, to enable welfare comparisons across
scenarios, we assume exogenously given weights. The Pareto-efficient solution is found
by choosing CN, u, v, R, and p to maximize:
J C L e dt C L DPL eN N N t S S S SN N S= ( )( ) + −( ) ( )( ) −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦




subject to (1), (2a), (2b), (3), and (6), A(0) = A0, P(0) = P0, K(0) = K0, and CN, CS 3 0.
Cooperation between North and South needs to be supported by binding agree-
ments. Precommitment is difficult in the absence of suitable institutions that can
enforce global decisions. Nonetheless, cooperative solutions, though lacking credibility,
are important insofar as they indicate the welfare losses that are likely to ensue given
a lack of commitment.
3. The Analytical Solution
Given the returns-to-scale properties of the underlying production functions, the long-
run equilibrium of the trade game, be it cooperative or non-cooperative, is not
stationary, but will involve steady growth that reflects the underlying technology and
preference structure. Consequently, in order to express the model in terms of stationary
quantities it needs to be appropriately scaled to reflect the equilibrium of ongoing
growth; see Eicher and Turnovsky (1999). To that end, and irrespective of the trading
regime, we envisage a steady-state equilibrium in which a number of balanced growth
conditions hold. First, since the final goods, Y, are either consumed in the North, CN, or
in the South, CS, or invested as physical capital, K, they will all grow at the same rate.
Second, for a balanced growth to exist, it is required that the benefits from per capita
consumption relative to the disutility from pollution at the margin have to remain
constant in the South. Consequently, technology, A, the pollution stock, P, raw mater-
ials, R, and the relative price, p, will all grow at different constant rates.
Given these assumptions, we first time-differentiate the production function and the
instantaneous utility of South. Making the necessary substitutions from equations (2a),
(2b), and (6), we obtain the following balanced growth rates (denoted by “ˆ”):
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆY K C C
n n
N S
A R L L R S S N A
K
= = = = +
( )[ ] + + −( )( )[ ] −( )
−
α ε θ α β α α τ γ θ β
α
1















ˆ ,A g n g nA L K Y N A N= −( ) +( ) ≡−1 1β β β (9b)
ˆ ,P g n n n g nS Y S S N N P N= + −( )( )[ ] ≡γ τ γ (9c)
ˆ ,R g g n g nA P N R N= +( ) ≡−θ ε1 (9d)
910 Sibel Sirakaya, Stephen J. Turnovsky, and Nedim M. Alemdar
© 2009 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
ˆ ˆ ˆ ,p C R g n g nS A A K Y L N p N= − ≡ −( ) −( ) −( ) −[ ] ≡− −θ β θ β εβ εβ1 11 1 (9e)
and gi, i = Y, A, P, R, p are the respective growth factors.
These long-run equilibrium growth rates have been written in a recursive form. First,
(9a) expresses the common long-run growth rate pertaining to production, capital
accumulation in the North, and consumption in the two regions. Given gY, (9b) to (9e)
then yield the corresponding expressions for the growth rate of technology, pollution,
resource extraction, and the relative price. As a general observation, all the structural
parameters have broad effects on the growth rates, reflecting the high degree of inter-
action between the two economies. Thus, even though North is indifferent to South’s
pollution when choosing its optimal policies, nonetheless, some pollution parameters
enter as determinants of North’s long-run consumption, capital, output and technology
growth rates. Notably, in an environment in which steady-state growth is possible, a
change in the technology spillover or in the environmental damage rate in the South,
affects not only the levels of North’s optimal policies, but also their permanent growth
rates.
In particular, the following features of the equilibrium merit comment. First,
∂Ŷ/∂q < 0 and ∂Ŷ/∂e > 0, implying that an increase in the long-run rate of environmen-
tal damage due to extraction in the South has an adverse effect on the growth rate of
output and consumption, while an improvement in the technology of pollution reduc-
tion raises the long-run growth rate. This is because more pollutant resources are
compensated by higher prices choking North’s growth, whereas environmentally-
friendlier technologies are reciprocated by lower resource prices and thereby faster
growth. Second, an increase in the growth rate of North’s final output tends to raise
the growth rates of knowledge and of resource extraction, as well as the growth rate
of the relative price.
An interesting aspect concerns the long-run behavior of pollution. To simplify
things, we assume the plausible case of a common population growth rate, nN = nS,
in which case sgn(P̂) = sgn[g S(gY - 1) + t]. Thus, whether the long-run equilibrium is
associated with positive or negative growth of pollution in the South depends
upon (i) the growth rate in the North, and (ii) South’s perception of pollution as a
“bad.”
To discuss the transitional dynamics, we transform each variable so that it is station-
ary in the steady state. Thus, we define the scaled variables as: y Y LN
gY≡ , k K LNgY≡ ,
c C Ln N N
gY≡ , a A LNgA≡ , r R LNgR≡ , p p LNg gY R* ≡ −( ), P P LNgP* ≡ . For convenience, we
shall refer to y, k, cn, a, r, p*, cs ≡ p*r, and P* as scale-adjusted quantities.7 Now, we can
rewrite the scale-adjusted output, and the accumulation of technology, physical capital,
and pollution stock as:
y a u vk rY A L K R= ( )φ α α α α , (10a)
a a u v k a j a n gA A A A A N AA L K= −( ) −( )[ ] − ≡ − = +φ δ δ δ δβ β β1 1 * * *, , (10b)
k y c p r k n gn K K K N Y= − − − = +* * *δ δ δ, , (10c)
P r a P n gP P P N P* * * *= ( ) − = +−1 θ δ δ δθ ε , . (10d)
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Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium Solution
We begin by considering the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution of the non-
cooperative trade game. After transforming the variables in (4) into the scale-adjusted
quantities, North’s planning problem can be expressed as choosing its rate of consump-
tion, cn, its demand for resources, r, allocation of labor and capital, u and v, and rates of
accumulation of capital, k̇, and technology, ȧ, to maximize:
J c e dt g nN N n t n N Y N NN n= ( ) = − −( )
∞ −∫ 1 10 γ ρ ρ γγ ρ , , (11)
subject to (10a) to (10c), cn 3 0, k(0) = k0, and a(0) = a0, where South’s terms of trade
are taken as given. Performing the optimization, the following necessary conditions
obtain:
cnNγ λ− =1 1, (12a)
λ α λ β1 2 1L Ly u j u( ) = −( )( ), (12b)
λ α λ β1 2 1K Ky v j v( ) = −( )( ), (12c)
αR y r p( ) = *, (12d)
α λ λ β δ ρ λ λK K K ny k j k( ) + ( ) ( ) − = − ( )2 1 1 1*  , (12e)
β λ λ α δ ρ λ λA A A nj a y a( ) + ( ) ( ) − = − ( )1 2 2 2*  , (12f)








−= =ρ ρλ λ1 20 0 (12g)
where l1, l2 are the shadow values of aggregate physical capital and knowledge,
respectively.
Equation (12a) states that along the optimal paths the marginal utility of consump-
tion should equal the shadow value of physical capital at every point in time.
Equations (12b) and (12c) determine the sectoral allocations of labor and capital so
that their respective marginal products are equated across sectors. Equation (12d)
asserts that the marginal product of the resource must equal its cost, p. The next two
equations describe the two arbitrage conditions. The first equates the net return to
physical capital to the return on consumption, both measured in terms of the final
output. Analogously, (12f) requires that the return on technology be equated to the
return on consumption, both expressed in units of knowledge. Finally, (12g) expresses
the transversality conditions.
Combining (12d) with (10a), North’s demand for the natural resource can be
expressed as
r a u vk pR Y A L K
R R= ( )( ) ( )−( ) − −( )α φ α α α α α1 1 1 1* . (13)
From equations (10a), (10b), (12b), and (12c), the optimal shares of labor and capital
in the final good production are u = u(l1, l2, a, k) and v = v(l1, l2, a, k). These can be
shown to imply that an increase in the stock of physical capital or technology raises
the productivity of both sectors in proportion to an amount that depends upon the
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respective productive elasticity. Resources therefore move toward the sector in which
that input has the greater production elasticity.
Faced with North’s demand for the resource, given by (13), and taking North’s






s S Y N S SJ c DP e dt g n nS s
*
*= ( ) −( ) = − −( )∞ −∫ 10 γ ρ ρ γγ ρ (14)
subject to (10a), (10c), and (10d), cs 3 0, k(0) = k0, and P P* *0 0( ) = .
The necessary optimality conditions for the South are:
c p a rs R R RSγ ε θα α μ α μ− −


































− + = − ( )−( ) ,D P sμ δ ρ μ μ21 2 2*  (15c)








−= =ρ ρμ μ1 20 0* (15d)
where m1, m2 are the respective shadow values of the stocks of physical capital and
pollution.
From equation (15a), South’s optimal terms of trade must be so chosen so that
the sum of incremental benefits from consumption and physical capital equals the
marginal cost of pollution. Note from equation (15b), that the value of an extra
unit of physical capital stock in the South, not surprisingly, evolves differently from
the North insofar as the former internalizes the interaction between capital and pol-
lution accumulation. Equation (15c), on the other hand, shows how the marginal
social cost of pollution will evolve as pollution itself accumulates over time. Remem-
bering that along the balanced growth path scale-adjusted pollution is constant, and
solving for m2 from equation (15c), the transversality condition (15d) is satisfied only
if the equilibrium shadow value of the scaled pollution is equal to − +D P s/ *( )δ ρ
throughout.
Next, we consider the Nash equilibrium of this game at the steady state. A joint
stationary solution of the optimality conditions for both regions determines the long-
run equilibrium of the trade game. Hence, assuming steady state, the following set of
equations constitutes the Nash equilibrium where the stationary variables are denoted
by “˜”:
      y k c k p r kn K( ) − ( ) − ( ) − =* *δ 0, (16a)
 j a A( ) − =δ* 0, (16b)
1 0
1θ δε θ( )( ) − =−  P a r P* * , (16c)
αR y r p  ( ) − =* 0, (16d)
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   v u u uK L K L L K− ( ) + −( )[ ] =−α β α β α β 1 01 , (16e)
α δ β α β ρK K K L L ny k u u y k     ( ) − + −( )( ) ( ) − =−* 1 01 , (16f)
β δ α β α ρA A A L L nj a u u j a     ( ) − + ( ) −( )[ ] ( ) − =−* 1 01 , (16g)
− ( ) − ( ) − +
+
−













     

*
* * *( [ ( )] )
(
1
K K s Py k
r D










We proceed to solve the system of equations as follows. First, we obtain the equilib-
rium growth rate of technology,    j a J A= from (16b). Given the growth rate of
technology, (16g) then implies the stationary sectoral allocation of labor, ũ. Having
derived ũ, we use (16e) and (16f) to solve for the long-run sectoral allocation of capital,
ṽ, and the output–capital ratio, ỹ/k̃, respectively. Given ỹ/k̃, the ratio of the South’s
consumption to capital, p̃*r̃/k̃ can now be derived from (16d). Knowing ỹ/k̃ and p̃*r̃/k̃,
(16a) determines the ratio of the North’s consumption to capital, c̃n/k̃, while (16c) and
(16h) determine the ratio  P k S* γ . Given  P k S* γ , ũ, and ṽ, the ratio  r k S K Aθ γ εβ β+ −( )1 can
be obtained from (16b) and (16c). We use the production function for the final good
and (16b) to find the stock of capital, k̃, given  r k S K Aθ γ εβ β+ −( )1 , ỹ/k̃, ũ, and ṽ. Having
obtained k̃, ã and r̃ are derived from (16b) given ũ and ṽ and the ratio  r k S K Aθ γ εβ β+ −( )1 .
Finally, given r̃ and p̃*r̃/k̃ we solve for p̃*.
Open-Loop Cooperative Solution
In order for the cooperative equilibrium to exist, it is necessary that the scale-adjusted
discount rates be the same for both regions; rn = rs = r. Although this condition is not
required for non-cooperative equilibrium, nonetheless we choose parameter values to
satisfy this requirement so that we can compare the equilibria under cooperative and
non-cooperative modes of trade.
The Pareto-efficient paths maximize the weighted sum of welfares:
max
, , , ,c p r u v
N n S s
t
n
N SJ c c DP e dt
*
*= ( ) + −( ) ( ) −( )[ ]∞ −∫ ω γ ω γγ γ ρ1 1 10 , (17)
subject to (10a) to (10d), cn, cs 3 0, k(0) = k0, a(0) = a0, and P P* *0 0( ) = . Although, at first
blush this may seem like a straightforward optimization problem, in contrast with the
non-cooperative mode of the game, any attempt at solution defies this early optimism.
Unfortunately, the steady state of the model does not admit a closed-form solution
unless w = 0.5 and gN = gS, except for the sectoral allocations of labor and physical
capital, and the output–capital ratio.
The necessary optimality conditions are:
ω υγcnN − =1 1, (18a)
1 1 1−( ) =−ω υγcs S , (18b)
α υ υθ εR y r r a( ) + =− −1 1 3 0, (18c)
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υ α υ β1 2 1L Ly u j u( ) = −( )( ), (18d)
υ α υ β ν1 2 1K Ky v j( ) = −( )( ), (18e)
α δ υ υ β ρ υ υK K Ky k j k( ) − + ( ) ( ) = − ( )* 2 1 1 1 , (18f)
β δ υ υ α υ υ ε θ ρ υ υθ εA A Aj a y a a r a( ) − + ( ) ( ) − ( ) = − ( )− −* 1 2 3 2 1 2 2( ) , (18g)
− −( ) − = − ( )−1 3 1 3 3ω υ δ ρ υ υD P*  , (18h)












−= = =ρ ρ ρυ υ υ1 2 30 0 0* (18i)
where u1, u2, and u3 are the shadow values of capital, technology and pollution,
respectively.
We note from (18a) and (18b) that along the Pareto-efficient paths, the weighted
marginal utilities of consumption in both regions are the same. Moreover, (18a), (18b),
and (18c) imply an efficient resource price which would equate the marginal global
benefits of resource use (the weighted marginal utility of consumption in both regions
times the marginal product of the resource) to the marginal pollution costs in the South
(valued at the shadow price of pollution in the South). Also, (18d) and (18e) indicate a
sectoral allocation rule for labor and capital such that productivities are equalized at
the margin. Finally, (18f), (18g), and (18h) indicate how the globally efficient shadow
values of k, a, and P* will move over time. Once again, note that (18h) and the
corresponding transversality condition in (18i) imply that the optimal shadow price of
scaled pollution is constant.
The following system of equations indicate the steady state of the cooperative trade
game where the efficient levels of the stationary variables are denoted by “˘”:
      
y k c k p r kn K( ) − ( ) − ( ) − =−* *1 0δ , (19a)
 
j a A( ) − =δ* 0, (19b)
1 0
1θ δε θ( )( ) − =−  P a r P* * , (19c)
ω ωγ γ  c p rn N S− −− −( )( ) =1 11 0* , (19d)
   
v u u uK L K L L K− + −( )[ ] =−α β α β α β 1 01 , (19e)
α δ β α β ρK K K L Ly k u u y k
     ( ) − + −( )[ ] ( ) − =−* 1 01 , (19f)
β δ α ε θ α β α ρA A A R L Lj a u u j a
     ( ) − + +( ) −( )[ ] ( ) − =−* ( ) ,1 01 (19g)
α ω ρ δ ωγ ε θR n Py c a DrN
   − − −− + −( ) =1 1 1 0( ) .* (19h)
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These equations are analogous to (16) and can be solved in a parallel way.
4. Simulations of the Model
We discretize the cooperative and non-cooperative games along the lines suggested by
Mercenier and Michel (1994), which ensures the steady-state invariance between the
continuous model and its discrete analog, and use genetic algorithms to approximate
the steady state as well as the transient dynamics under various parameter configura-
tions. The numerical procedures are described in detail in an appendix available from
the authors on request.
Numerical Parameters and Baseline Equilibria
Table 1 displays the set of benchmark parameter values used in the numerical simula-
tions. Insofar as possible, the baseline parameter values are adapted from earlier
calibration studies and are generally conventional. Production of both the final goods
and the new technologies exhibit increasing returns to scale.8 We assume that both
regions have the same rate of time preference and intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion, of 0.04 and 0.67, respectively. Physical capital is assumed to depreciate at the
conventional rate of 5%. Knowledge, on the other hand, depreciates at a slower rate of
1%, while the rate of depreciation of pollution is assumed to be 7%. Populations in
both regions are assumed to grow at 1.5%. Information on pollution parameter values
is sparse, and therefore we conduct some sensitivity analysis with alternative parameter
values. Equal weights, w = 0.5, are assigned to both regions in the cooperative
trade game.
These benchmark parameter values yield the growth factors: gY = 1.710, gA = 2.105,
gp = -0.355, and gR = 0.033, implying a per capita growth rate of output, capital, and
consumption of around 1.07%. Also, the benchmark equilibrium is characterized by an
increasing resource extraction and a declining pollution in the South. Table 2b reports
the total discounted North, South, and global welfares. The equilibrium values of other
key variables are given in Table 2a.
Table 2b brings out a conflict between North and South with regard to the benefits
from cooperation. By acting non-cooperatively North increases its welfare by 24.91%,
while reducing South’s welfare by 65.59%. The net effect of this unwillingness to
cooperate is that the inefficiencies associated with non-cooperation impose a severe
global welfare loss of 23.96%. In setting the resource price, South internalizes the local
cost of pollution, as well as extracting monopoly rent from North. From a global
perspective, to the extent that North also cares about the South’s environment,
resource prices would be inefficiently low because they would reflect only the local cost
Table 1. Benchmark Parameters
Production fY = 1.0 aK = 0.40 aL = 0.60 aA = 0.20 aR = 0.15
Technology fA = 1.0 bK = 0.20 bL = 0.50 bA = 0.60
Pollution dP = 0.07 e = 0.20 q = 2.0 t = 0.0
Preferences rN = 0.04 rS = 0.04 g N = -0.5 g S = -0.5 D = 0.05
Depreciation and
population
dK = 0.05 dA = 0.01 nN = 0.015 nS = 0.015
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of pollution. But this would be partly alleviated due to the exercise of monopoly power
by the South, which therefore has some beneficial effects.
For its part, North chooses a resource allocation so as to maximize its own welfare.
Resources that go to the production of final goods yield immediate higher consump-
tion while those that are employed in the technology sector will yield a higher con-
sumption only in the future. Since (i) delaying consumption is costly, (ii) resources that
pollute South are employed only in the final goods production, and (iii) neither region
internalizes the knowledge spillover, the non-cooperative equilibrium leads to an inef-
ficiently small knowledge sector from a global perspective [298.1 vs 317.6]. As a result,
non-cooperative behavior leads to an excess production of final goods, causing an
over-accumulation of physical capital [54.7 vs 49.4] and an over-usage of resources [1.82
vs 1.13], the latter ultimately leading to an excessive level of pollution in the South [8.23
vs 3.09]. Next, we study the dynamic responses of regions to changes in some structural
parameters.
Dynamic Responses to Structural Changes
Tables 3 to 5 and Figures 1 to 3 summarize the dynamic responses from the initial
benchmark equilibrium, in response to various structural changes, namely (i) a 30%
increase of productivity in the knowledge producing sector; (ii) an increase in knowl-
edge diffusion from e = 0.20 to e = 0.60; (iii) a doubling in the resource damage rate
from q = 2.0 to q = 4.0.
Productivity shocks in technology sector from jA = 1.0 to jA = 1.30 Being a nonscale
model, all long-run growth rates remain unchanged. The productivity shock, however,
generates transitional dynamics that have permanent level effects. Irrespective of the
trading regime, the equilibrium levels of the scaled variables change significantly,
leading to welfare improvements in both regions. The results are summarized in
Tables 3a and 3b.9
The transition paths are illustrated in Figure 1. Since the technology sector does not
employ the raw material, a productivity increase in that sector does not have an

















4.529 1.125 0.893 0.933 49.35 3.089 317.6 5.094
Non-cooperation p̃* r̃ ũ ṽ k̃ P̃* ã c̃n
1.275 1.823 0.899 0.937 54.67 8.225 298.1 9.035
%D Coop. to Non-coop. -71.86 62.14 0.75 0.47 10.79 166.3 -6.16 77.37
(b) Total discounted welfares
North South Global
Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop.
-24.66 -32.84 -63.86 -38.57 -88.53 -71.41
%D Coop. to Non-coop. 24.91 -65.59 -23.96
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immediate direct simulating effect on the demand for the resource; rather its effect is
indirect and occurs over time. On impact, the enhanced productivity in the technology
sector induces North to shift both labor and capital to that technology. Under coop-
eration, since the efficient resource price reflects the benefits of pollution abatement
from knowledge accumulation, it rises slightly to discourage production of the final
goods, thereby accommodating the sectoral reallocation of labor and capital. Under
non-cooperation, however, pollution costs are only internalized by the South while the

















5.837 1.139 0.893 0.933 64.39 2.704 699.1 6.647
%D from benchmark 28.88 1.25 0.00 0.00 30.48 -12.46 120.1 30.48
Non-cooperation p̃* r̃ ũ ṽ k̃ P̃* ã c̃n
1.643 1.846 0.899 0.937 71.34 7.200 656.0 11.79
%D from benchmark 28.88 1.25 0.00 0.00 30.48 -12.46 120.1 30.48
%D Coop. to Non-coop. -71.86 62.14 0.75 0.47 10.79 166.3 -6.16 77.37
(b) Total discounted welfares
North South Global
Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop.
-23.97 -32.04 -62.89 -37.67 -86.87 -69.711
%D from benchmark 2.79 2.44 1.52 2.34 1.87 2.38
%D Coop. to Non-coop. 25.18 -66.97 -24.61

















2.045 3.594 0.879 0.924 70.58 2.619 442.5 7.352
%D from benchmark -54.84 219.6 -1.49 -0.94 43.03 -15.22 39.32 44.33
Non-cooperation p̃* r̃ ũ ṽ k̃ P̃* ã c̃n
0.568 5.433 0.899 0.937 71.00 7.238 322.3 11.99
%D from benchmark -55.42 198.0 -0.013 -0.008 29.87 -12.01 8.12 32.72
%D Coop. to Non-coop. -72.22 51.15 2.27 1.42 0.59 176.4 -27.18 63.10
(b) Total discounted welfares
North South Global
Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop.
-21.82 -29.19 -58.36 -34.54 -80.18 -63.73
%D from benchmark 11.50 11.14 8.62 10.43 9.42 10.76
%D Coop. to Non-coop. 25.22 -68.94 -25.81
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benefits of knowledge spillovers are altogether discounted. Hence, the shift in labor and
capital to technology sector is smaller. Nonetheless, the demand for resources fall,
leading the South to lower the resource price for a short period of time after which
resource use rapidly increases and peaks. In both instances, knowledge accumulates
rapidly, while the capital stock actually declines slightly for a brief period because of the
higher productivity and the increased employment of labor and capital in the technol-
ogy sector.
Over time, as knowledge is accumulated in the North, the productivity of capital is
enhanced and it too is accumulated. The expansion of final output in the North stimu-
lates the demand for resources.This induces South to start raising its price. However, its
effect is to less than offset the rising demand under cooperation, so that the rate of
resource extraction keeps increasing at a steady, though declining rate. Under non-
cooperation, however, the effect of increasing price is to more than offset the rising
demand, so that the rate of resource extraction, after the brief initial increase and peak,
declines at a steady, though declining rate.
The increase in capital accumulation and final output induces the North to gradually
shift its capital and labor back toward the production of final output, ultimately
restoring the initial allocation. The initial increase in resource extraction under non-
cooperation slightly increases the level of pollution in the South. However, this declines
after a short period due to the decline in the rate of resource extraction plus the
improved abatement due to the higher stock of technology. In the long run, pollution in
the South declines substantially by about 12.46%. The important point to observe is
that a technological improvement in North’s knowledge sector leads to a long-run
reduction in pollution, and therefore an improvement in South’s welfare, albeit modest.
Increase in the knowledge diffusion e from 0.20 to 0.60 This form of techno-
logical increase does have implications for the long-run growth rates, raising the growth
factors of final output, gY, technology, gA, and resource, gR, to 1.833, 2.166, and 0.442,

















4.644 1.061 0.896 0.935 47.619 1.568 295.6 4.927
%D from benchmark 2.53 -5.67 0.38 0.24 -3.51 -49.23 -6.95 -3.28
Non-cooperation p̃* r̃ ũ ṽ k̃ P̃* ã c̃n
1.566 1.362 0.899 0.937 50.224 4.290 286.3 8.293
%D from benchmark 22.86 -25.30 0.001 0.0003 -8.14 -47.84 -3.95 -8.22
%D Coop. to Non-coop. -66.28 28.40 0.38 0.24 5.47 173.56 -3.14 68.32
(b) Total discounted welfares
North South Global
Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop.
-25.44 -33.04 -60.88 -37.09 -86.33 -70.14
%D from benchmark -3.16 -0.61 4.66 3.82 2.49 1.79
%D Coop. to Non-coop. 23.01 -64.14 -23.08
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respectively, while reducing the growth factor of pollution, gP, to -0.416. From Table 4b
we see that this leads to a 9.42% increase in global welfare with uncoordinated trading
policies, and an even larger increase (10.76%) under cooperation, attesting to the
importance of access to knowledge. The implication is that returns from investment in
knowledge to North are not only in the form of improved productivity there, but
also in the form of lower resource prices due now to the higher rate of pollution
abatement in the South. Moreover, with the increased South’s capacity to absorb
technology, pollution will be less of a drag on growth in North. The equilibrium values
with the higher knowledge spillover rate are reported in Table 4a.
First, note the rise in the optimal long-run resource/capital and resource/knowledge
ratios under both cooperative and non-cooperative modes of trade. This will be true
because a higher rate of knowledge diffusion will reduce the long-run cost of pollution
and thereby the supply price of resources, and make the increased use of resources for
any given level of physical capital and knowledge optimal. Also noteworthy from
Figure 2 and Table 4a is the increase in the stationary physical capital and knowledge
stocks and the shares of labor and physical capital in the knowledge sector.10 Higher
physical capital due to lower price of resources allows North to shift resources to the
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Figure 1. Transitional Dynamics in Response to a Productivity Shock in the Technology
Sector (horizontal lines denote initial benchmark values)
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level. The marginal reduction in the pollution level due to higher knowledge stock
outweighs the incremental increase due to a higher resource use so that the overall
long-run pollution level will fall.
As for the dynamic adjustments, Figure 2 shows that with higher knowledge spill-
overs, the marginal cost of pollution falls, thus inducing South to instantly reduce the
price for the resource, to which North’s immediate response is to increase its usage. In
the short run, the lower resource price enables North to accumulate more physical
capital, which under non-cooperation, causes North to shift resources to the production
of final output. This causes a temporary decline in level of technology, which, however,
is reversed as the physical capital is accumulated and the productivity of knowledge is
enhanced. Under cooperation, since North internalizes the knowledge spillovers,
resources are shifted to the technology sector.
Over time, as knowledge is accumulated in the North, the productivity of capital is
enhanced and it too is accumulated. The expansion of final output in the North further
stimulates the demand for resources and this induces South to raise its price. Under
cooperation, the increase in demand more than offsets the rise in price so that the rate
of resource extraction keeps increasing at a steady, though declining, rate. Under
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Figure 2. Transitional Dynamics in Response to Increased Knowledge Diffusion (hori-
zontal lines denote initial benchmark values)
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the rising demand, so that the rate of resource extraction, after the initial instant
increase, declines at a steady, though declining rate, leveling off at 198% of its bench-
mark value.
While the increase in resource extraction increases pollution in the South, the
improvement in the diffusion of knowledge together with the increase in its stock has
the opposite effect. Whereas the latter effect is dominant throughout under coopera-
tion, under non-cooperation, the former initially dominates to give in, eventually, to the
latter. Ultimately, the level of pollution declines by 15.22% and 12.01% under coop-
eration and non-cooperation, respectively.
Increase in resource damage rate q from 2.0 to 4.0 As far as balanced growth factors
are concerned, the most notable effect is on gR which falls from 0.033 to 0.017.The other
growth factors, gY, gA, and gP all decrease slightly, namely to 1.705, 2.103, and -0.353,
respectively.
The new equilibrium values and the associated welfare are displayed in Tables 5a
and 5b. Notice that in contrast to a favorable productivity shock in the final good sector
in the North or to an increase in knowledge diffusion in the South the welfare effects
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Figure 3. Transitional Dynamics in Response to Increased Resource Damage Rate
(horizontal lines denote initial benchmark values)
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increase in the potential damage to South’s environment while South would be a
beneficiary regardless of the trading regime. This could be explained by noting from
Tables 5a and 5b that consumption in both regions falls but pollution is reduced
drastically thereby causing a slight improvement in South’s welfare. When resource
extraction becomes more harmful to South’s environment, the long-run marginal cost
of pollution rises leading South to increase the resource price. With higher long-run
resource prices, North cuts production of both the final good and the technology. Also,
since the resource is relatively more expensive now, the final good is produced with
relatively less resource and more capital and labor that become available from the
diminished technology sector. While the decreased resource use causes pollution in
the South to decline, decreased technology has the opposite effect. But the former
dominates resulting in lower pollution in the South. With cooperation, as pollution is
globally internalized, the efficient resource price rises less so that these effects on
welfares are less pronounced. While North’s welfare deteriorates less, South’s welfare
improves less, too.
The dynamic adjustments are illustrated in Figure 3. As the order of environmental
damage increases, the marginal cost of pollution rises.This induces South to immediately
increase the price for the resource, to which North’s instant response is to decrease its
usage, causing the rate of physical capital accumulation to decline. Under non-
cooperation, as only South internalizes the increased pollution costs, relative to the
benchmark non-cooperative scenario, the rise in the resource price is much sharper.
Increased resource price and decreased productivity in the final good sector also induces
North to shift resources toward the production of knowledge in the short run.This causes
a temporary increase in level of technology, which, however, is reversed as the physical
capital is reduced and the productivity of knowledge declines. Under cooperation, the
resource price rises to reflect the now increased global cost of the resource extraction,
thereby inducing North to shift resources away from the production of knowledge in the
short run to substitute for the resource in the production of the final good.
Under non-cooperation, decreased resource use and initial increase in technology
causes pollution to decrease rapidly. Under cooperation, while the decline in resource
extraction decreases pollution in the South, the decrease in the stock of knowledge has
the opposite effect. However, the former effect dominates and since the decline in
knowledge is in fact only modest, whereas the decline in resource extraction occurs
immediately, the net effect is a rapid decline in the level of pollution in the South. As
a result of declining resource demand and pollution, the resource price starts decreas-
ing. This causes the resource extraction to start picking up under non-cooperation.
However, the increase in price is less than proportionate under cooperation, so that the
resource demand keeps declining. Eventually, resource extraction levels off at a level
5.67% below its benchmark value under cooperation and 25.30% below its benchmark
value under non-cooperation.
With cooperation, the decline in pollution due to decreasing resource extraction
keeps dominating the increase in pollution due to declining stock of knowledge, so that
the level of pollution in the South keeps decreasing. Under non-cooperation, pollution
depreciates more than the increase in pollution due to increasing resource extraction
and declining stock of knowledge, so that the level of pollution in the South keeps
decreasing under non-cooperation as well. Eventually, pollution levels off at a level
around 49.23% below its initial value under cooperation and around 47.84% below its
initial value under non-cooperation. The change in the level of pollution is more
significant in the cooperative game since the positive effect of knowledge spillovers on
pollution accumulation is internalized in both regions.
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5. Conclusion
To highlight the potential strategic asymmetries in the world trade, the paper has
constructed a dynamic game between the North and the South. South causes local
pollution while extracting a resource that it sells to North at a monopoly price. North
uses the resource, together with capital, labor, and knowledge, to produce a final good
to consume, to invest, and to sell to South at a fixed world price. North’s growth is
endogenously generated by the technology sector that produces knowledge which
flows freely to South to help abate pollution from resource extraction there.
North chooses a resource allocation with a view to maximizing own welfare, ignoring
the deleterious effects of its policies on South’s environment. South, on the other hand,
sets the resource price to reflect the local cost of pollution as well as to extract
monopoly rent from North, neglecting the effects of its policy on North’s growth. From
a global perspective, resource prices are inefficiently low because they only reflect the
local cost of pollution. This, however, is partly alleviated by South’s monopoly power.
Moreover, while the final goods can be immediately consumed, labor and capital
allocated to the technology sector will bring, via increased productivity, higher con-
sumption only in the future. Given that delaying consumption is costly to North, that
natural resources are employed only in the final goods production, and that neither
region internalizes the knowledge spillovers, all lead to an inefficiently small knowledge
sector from a global perspective. An excess production of the final goods causes an
over-accumulation of physical capital and an over-use of resources, the latter ultimately
leading to an excessive level of pollution in the South. These results are replicated
under various parameter configurations.
Further, although the pollution we consider is local in nature, it has global ramifica-
tions for growth. All else being the same, an increased rate of knowledge diffusion in
the South makes resource extraction less costly, leading to lower prices and thus faster
accumulation of both physical capital and knowledge in the North. Conversely, North’s
growth can be checked if resource extraction creates more damage to South’s environ-
ment. Trade couples the regions and acts as a conduit for the local changes to be
transmitted to each other.
Owing to the inefficiencies that accompany the non-cooperative mode of trade,
global welfare is substantially lower under non-cooperation than it is under coopera-
tion. Also, a regime switch from a non-cooperative to a cooperative trade regime is
always beneficial to South and harmful to North. Consequently, not only is North
unwilling to cooperate, but also the inefficiencies that arise from such a reluctance are
severe.
References
Alemdar, Nedim M. and Suheyla Ozyildirim, “A Genetic Game of Trade, Growth and Exter-
nalities,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22 (1998):811–32.
———, “Knowledge Spillover, Transboundary Pollution and Growth,” Oxford Economic Papers
54 (2002):597–616.
Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. and Hamid Beladi,“A Stackelberg Game Model of Trade in Renewable
Resources with Competitive Sellers,” Review of International Economics 14 (2006):136–47.
Benhabib, Jess and Roy Radner, “The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A Game-
Theoretic Approach,” Economic Theory 2 (1992):155–90.
Bovenberg, A. Lans and Sjak A. Smulders, “Environmental Quality and Pollution-Augmenting
Technological Change in a Two-Sector Endogenous Growth Model,” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 57 (1995):369–91.
924 Sibel Sirakaya, Stephen J. Turnovsky, and Nedim M. Alemdar
© 2009 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Chander, Parkash and Henry Tulkens, “Theoretical Foundations of Negotiations and Cost
Sharing in Transfrontier Pollution Problems,” European Economic Review 36 (1992):388–98.
Chichilnisky, Graciela, “North–South Trade and the Global Environment,” American Economic
Review 84 (1994):851–74.
Dasgupta, Partha, The Control of Resources, Oxford: Blackwell (1982).
Dockner, Engelbert J. and Ngo V. Long, “International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus
Non-Cooperative Strategies,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24
(1993):13–29.
Eicher, Theo S. and Stephen J. Turnovsky, “Non-Scale Models of Economic Growth,” Economic
Journal 109 (1999):394–415.
Eriksson, Clas and Ficre Zehaie, “Population Density, Pollution and Growth,” Environmental
and Resource Economics 30 (2005):465–84.
Galor, Oded,“Global Dynamic Inefficiency in the Absence of International Policy Coordination:
A North–South Case,” Journal of International Economics 21 (1986):137–49.
Gradus, Raymond and Sjak Smulders, “The Trade-Off between Environmental Care and Long
Term Growth—Pollution in Three Prototype Growth Models,” Journal of Economics 58
(1993):25–51.
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman, “Trade, Innovation and Growth,” American Eco-
nomic Review, Papers and Proceedings 81 (1991):86–91.
Hettich, Frank, Economic Growth and Environmental Policy. A Theoretical Approach, Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar (2000).
Hoel, Michael, “Coordination of Environmental Policy for Transboundary Environmental Prob-
lems?” Journal of Public Economics 66 (1997):199–224.
Jones, Charles I., “R&D Based Models of Economic Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 103
(1995):759–84.
Karp, Larry, “Optimality and Consistency in a Differential Game with Non-Renewable
Resources,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 8 (1984):73–97.
Levhari, David and Leonard Mirman, “The Great Fishwar: An Example using a Dynamic
Cournot–Nash Solution,” Bell Journal 11 (1980):322–34.
Mercenier, Jean and Philippe Michel, “Discrete-Time Finite Horizon Approximation of Infinite
Horizon Optimization Problems with Steady-State Invariance,” Econometrica 62 (1994):635–
56.
Sorger, Gerhard, “Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria in a Class of Resource Games,” Economic
Theory 11 (1998):79–100.
van der Ploeg, Frederick and Aart J. de Zeeuw, “International Aspects of Pollution Control,”
Environmental and Resource Economics 2 (1992):117–39.
———, “Investment in Clean Technology and Transboundary Pollution Control,” in Carlo
Carraro (ed.), Trade, Innovation, Environment, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press (1994).
Notes
1. Early studies analyzing resource policy in a strategic framework include Levhari and Mirman
(1980) and Dasgupta (1982). Many studies use dynamic game theory to focus on various aspects
of environmental issues such as joint exploitation of natural resources (Benhabib and Radner,
1992; Sorger, 1998) and transboundary pollution (Chander and Tulkens, 1992; van der Ploeg and
de Zeeuw, 1992, 1994; Dockner and Long, 1993; Hoel, 1997).
2. Since the focus of the paper is to explore how various sources of inefficiencies interact to
distort growth in a strategic framework, not the credibility of the optimal regional policies, we
focus on open-loop strategies. Unless a quadratic–linear framework is adopted at the outset,
numerical approximation of feedback Nash policies is fraught with difficulties. It is also obvious
that the quadratic–linear framework is not suitable for modeling permanent growth. Karp (1984)
and Batabyal and Beladi (2006) focus on issues of credibility within the context of a differential
Stackelberg game.
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3. It could also be endowed with a fixed supply of capital, so that its production function is of the
form R(t) = bLS(t)K̄S, where K̄S denotes the fixed capital domiciled South.
4. That is, the population growth rate in the South is greater than or equal to the growth rate of
the demand for the resource by the North.
5. This dichotomy in the technologies of North and South is pretty standard and serves to
sharpen the analysis; see e.g. Galor (1986).
6. Thus, pollution is a “joint output” with resources in the South, increasing with its extraction.
7. See Eicher and Turnovsky (1999).
8. Production elasticities in the production of final output are well documented. However, much
less empirical literature exists with respect to the production function for knowledge, especially
if separate elasticities for labor, capital, and technology are required. Our parametrization
employs the assumption that the production function for knowledge is relatively intensive in
knowledge.
9. A comparable productivity increase in the final goods sector (discussed in an expanded
version of this paper), generates a larger increase in the equilibrium levels, leading to larger
welfare gains.
10. Because the benchmark equilibrium value of p* and the new equilibrium differ significantly
in magnitude, the benchmark equilibrium value is not drawn in Figures 2a.1 and 2a.2 to make the
dynamics visible.
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